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THE NEW SUPPLEMENTAL JURISDICTION STATUTE -
FLAWED BUT FIXABLE 
Wendy Collins Perdue* 
It is relatively rare for· Congress to involve itself in federal courts issues 
and I think that ef{plains, at least in part, the intensity of reaction about 
the new supplemental jurisdiction statute.1 If this were a tax reform pro-
vision, we would all understand that the political opportunities for such 
reforms are limited and must be taken whenever they occur. We would 
also understand that in the rush to take advantage of such opportunities, 
ambiguities or technical flaws inevitably result. These ambiguities or 
flaws would not be cause for undue concern. Instead, we would all await 
the Treasury Regulations or be confident of technical amendments the 
following year. Alas, there are no regulations forthcoming and if the 
venue statute is any indication, flaws in a technical federal courts statute 
can bedevil the courts for a generation before Congress fixes them.2 
I agree with Professors Rowe, Burbank, and Mengler3 that as a result 
of Finley v. United States,4 there was a strong need for legislative action 
in this area. I believe that Finley was not only wrong as concerned the 
facts of that particular case, but also that the language of the opinion was 
extremely sweeping and threatened to destabilize settled law.5 It is re-
markable and commendable that the damage done by Finley was undone 
as quickly as it was. 
* Associate Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center. 
1 28 U.S.C.A. § 1367 (West Supp. 1991). 
• The courts struggled for many years to determine where a claim "arose" within the meaning of 
28 U.S.C. § 1391. See Leroy v. Great W. United Corp., 443 U.S. 173, 184-86 {1979); CHARLES A. 
WRIGHT, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS 242-43 {4th ed. 1983). This was finally addressed in the 1990 
amendments to § 1391. Similarly, there was great uncertainty on the meaning of § 1391(c), see 
WRIGHT, supra, at 247, that was clarified in the 1988 amendments to§ 1391(c). See John B. Oakley, 
Recent Statutory Changes in the Law of Federal jurisdiction and Venue: The judicial Improvement 
Acts of 1988 and 1990, 24 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 735, 770-74 (1991). 
3 Thomas D. Rowe, Jr., Stephen B. Burbank & Thomas M. Mengler, Compounding or Creat-
ing Confusion about Supplemental jurisdiction? A Reply to Professor Freer, 40 EMORY L.J. 943, 
945-47 (1991). • 
• 490 u.s. 545 {1989). 
• See Wendy Collins Perdue, Finley v. United States: Unstringing Pendent jurisdiction, 76 VA. 
L. REV. 539 {1990). 
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I also agree with Professors Freer and Arthur6 that this statute, partic-
ularly subsection (b), has some significant prol;>lems. While it is undoubt-
edly true that eventually the ambiguities would be resolved by the courts, 
it would be preferable to seek statutory corrections. 
I. MINOR QUIBBLES 
Before turning to subsection (b), I have a few quibbles with subsections 
(a) and (c). I should stress that these are not major objections and they 
alone would not warrant statutory change. However, in the event Con-
gress undertook other changes in the statute, it might consider changes 
here as well. 
·Subsection (a) of the statute provides for supplemental jurisdiction over 
all claims "that are so related to claims in the action within such original 
jurisdiction that they form part of the same case or controversy under 
Article III of the United States Constitution."' This language apparently 
contemplates that supplemental jurisdiction will be available under the 
test articulated in United Mine Workers v. Gibbs.8 That test focuses on 
whether the claims "derive from a common nucleus of operative fact." 9 I 
believe it would haye been preferable to have specified in the statute the 
test for supplemental jurisdiction rather than simply refer to the Constitu-
tion. My concern is not that the courts will be unable to articulate a co-
herent test; instead I think it is unfortunate to require courts unnecessa-
rily to interpret the Constitution.10 As Professors Teply and Whitten have 
argued: 
Nothing in Article III explicitly requires that the scope of 'case' or 
'controversy' be defined by reference to the factual relationship be-
8 Thomas C. Arthur & Richard D. Freer, Grasping at Burnt Straws: The Disaster of the Sup-
plemental jurisdiction Statute, 40 EMORY L.J. 963 (1991}; Richard D. Freer, Compounding Confu-
sion and Hampering Diversity: Life after Finley and the Supplemental jurisdiction Statute, 40 EM-
ORY L.J. 445, 474-86 (1991). 
7 28 U.S.C.A. § 1367(a). 
• 383 U.S. 715 (1966). See Thomas M. Mengler, Stephen B. Burbank & Thomas D. Rowe, Jr., 
Recent Federal Court Legislation Made Some Noteworthy Changes, NAT'L L.J., Dec. 31, 1990 -
Jan. 7, 1991, at 20, 20. 
• Gibbs, 383 U.S. at 725. 
•• The Court has stated that "Gibbs delineated the constitutional limits or federal judicial 
power." Owen Equip. & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365, 371 (1978). This was, however, dicta 
and the Court has never been presented with a case that has required it to reconsider this. 
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tween the joined claims, as opposed to, for example, the entire rela-
tionship betw~en the parties to an action, which may include factu-
ally unrelated claims. Sound reasons may sometimes exist for 
defining the scope of a case or controversy to include unrelated 
claims - reasons grounded in policies designed to protect or en-
hance the operation of federal subject-matter jurisdiction.11 
71 
My other concern is with subsection (c). Here the statute appears to 
codify the discretion prong of Gibbs/2 but the tone of subsection (c) is 
some~hat different than Gibbs. Gibbs had stated that "pendent jurisdic-
tion is a doctrine of discretion, not of plaintiff's right"13 and then listed 
the relevant considerations. Subsection (c) enumerates three specific cir-
cumstances in which the courts may decline to exercise supplemental ju-
risdiction and then provides a catchall provision that allows courts to de-
cline jurisdiction · "in exceptional circumstances, [if] there are other 
compelling reasons for declining jurisdiction."14 The phrasing of this 
catchall provision seems to suggest that it is only in "exceptional circum-
stances" and for "compelling reasons" that jurisdiction should ever be de-
clined. Thus, subsection (c) could be read to suggest that the courts should 
be very sparing in exercising their discretion under this section - more 
sparing than Gibbs suggested. 
As noted above, however, this is largely a quibble. It is difficult to write 
precise rules concerning discretion. My hunch is that the courts will con-
tinue to exercise their discretion exactly as they have been and that this is 
what was intended. 
II. SuBSECTION (b) 
A. Supplemental jurisdiction and Diversity 
My primary concerns focus on subsection (b). Before addressing some 
of the ambiguities in the statute, a few preliminaries are in order. I com-
11 LARRY L. TEPLY & RAPLH U. WHITTEN, CiVIL PROCEDURE 102 (1991). 
12 See Gibbs, 383 U.S. at 726-27. The House Report states that subsection (c) "codifies the 
factors that the Supreme Court recognized as providing legitimate bases upon which a district court 
may decline jurisdiction over a supplemental claim." H.R. REP. No. 734, 101st Cong., 2d. Sess. 21 
(1990). 
13 Gibbs, 383 U.S. at 726. 
14 28 U.S.C.A. § 1367(c). 
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pletely agree with the approach of the statute which singles out diversity 
for different treatment. This different treatment is necessary not because 
diversity is the poor step-sister of federal quesLiOJl jurisdiction, but for a 
much less sinister reason. If supplemental jurisdiction were allowed in 
diversity cases to the full extent allowed by the Constitution, this would 
obliterate the total diversity rule. So long as there was diversity between 
one plaintiff and one defendant, supplemental jurisdiction could be used to 
add additional non-diverse plaintiffs and defendants. 
In addition, I think it appropriate that the subsection attempts to codify 
the principles set forth in Owen Equipment & Erection Co. v. K roger.111 
Kroger focused on several basic concerns in determining whether there 
should be supplemental jurisdict~on. First, the Court was concerned that 
an overly generous rule of supplemental jurisdiction would undermine the 
total diversity rule.16 Specifically, the Court was concerned about sneaky 
plaintiffs who might have claims against non-diverse defendants. The 
Court hypothesized that rather than abandon the federal forum as an op-
tion, the sneaky plaintiff might sue a diverse party in federal court, know-
ing that this defendant would implead the true target.17 The sneaky plain-
tiff could then rely on supplemental jurisdiction and sue the impleaded 
party. The underly}ng concern here seems to be one of docket control -
the Court did not want the availability of supplemental jurisdiction to 
increase the number of diversity cases in federal court. 
Second, I believe the Court wanted to avoid burdening trial judges with 
an undu!y fact specific inquiry. In the actual facts of Kroger, there was 
little reason to believe that Mrs. Kroger was a sneaky plaintiff seeking to 
circumvent the total diversity rule. Up until the middle of trial, everyone 
apparently believed that Mr!l. Kroger was diverse from the impleaded 
party.18 The majority, however, rejected this particularized inquiry and 
focused instead on the broader category of cases in which a plaintiff seeks. 
to claim against a non-diverse impleaded party. I agree that it makes 
sense to treat equally all cases in the same procedural posture. It is just 
not worth the effort to determine in each case whether, without supple-
mental jurisdiction, this particular plaintiff would have brought suit in 
•• 437 U.S. 365 (I 978). I disagree with Professor Freer on this. See Freer, supra note 6, at 476. 
18 Kroge~. 437 U.S. at 373-74, 377. 
11 /d. at 374-75. 
18 /d. at 378 (White, J. dissenting). 
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federal court anyway.19 
Another concern expressed in Kroger was a desire to promote fairness 
and efficiency.20 In distinguishing the situation in Kroger from situations 
involving impleader, cross-claims, or counterclaims, the Court stressed 
that the latter situations involve "claims by a defending party haled into 
court against his will."21 In addition, the Court observed that "[i]t is not' 
unreasonable to assume that, in generally requiring complete diversity, 
Congress did not intend to confine the jurisdiction of federal courts so 
inflexibly that they are unable to protect legal rights or effectively to re-
solve an entire, logically entwined lawsuit."22 
Thus, the Kroger Court was not indifferent to the issues of fairness and 
efficiency,23 but it was attempting to balance these against its concern for 
protecting the total diversity rule. Mrs. Kroger was forced to forgo her 
claim against the impleaded party and this may seem both inefficient and 
unfair since it would force her to litigate a second suit in state court.24 But 
as the Kroger Court pointed out, the plaintiff picked the forum and she 
could achieve the desired efficiency by taking the entire case to state 
court.25 Of course, to achieve this efficiency, the plaintiff must forgo her 
right to a federal forum for her claim against the original defendant. But 
the dilemma faced by the plaintiff is no different than she would have 
confronted had she wanted to sue both defendants originally __:_ the total 
19 Of course, even accepting that these issues should be addressed by category, an empirical 
question remains. Will allowing plaintiffs to claim against non-diverse impleaded parties in fact in-
crease the number of cases in federal court? Neither the Court, Congress, nor the statute's supporters 
offered any empirical data on this. See Rowe, Burbank & Mengler, supra note 3, at 952-53. Still, this 
is surely not the first time Congress has made a policy choice without any empirical basis. 
20 See Kroger, 437 U.S. at 376-77. 
21 Id. at 376. 
22 Id. at 377. 
23 I have argued elsewhere that fairness and efficiency are not really separate concerns, but are 
in many respects simply different descriptions of the same basic problem that arises when a litigant 
must litigate related claims in different fora. See Perdue, supra note 5, at 542-43. 
•• In fact, Mrs. Kroger was not forced simultaneously to litigate two different suits because her 
claim against the original defendant previously had been dismissed. See Kroger, 437 U.S. at 368. 
However, the Court did not limit its analysis or holding to such situations. 
•• Id. at 376. In Kroger, the plaintiff probably did suffer some actual burden and unfairness 
because she did not know until the middle of trial that the impleaded party was non-diverse and thus 
the dismissal of the claim resulted in a waste of time. However, as with the Court's concern for 
protecting the total diversity rule, the Court's approach to the unfairness concern focused on categories 
of cases, not on individual cases. 
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diversity rule forces plaintiffs to choose between their right to sue the di-
verse defendant in federal court or their desir~ for an efficient resolution 
against all defendants. The result is that the only way to accommodate the 
fairness and efficiency consideration is to abandon the previously discussed 
concern about preserving the total diversity rule and preventing an in-
crease of filings in the federal courts.26 
In some situations, efficiency and fairness can be accommodated without 
risking an increase in the number of cases in federal court. The most 
obvious situation is that of a defendant who may have a counterclaim that 
lacks the requisite amount in controversy or an impleader claim against a 
non-diverse third party.27 If supplemental jurisdiction is not allowed, 
there will have to be separate litigation. This is inefficient and, where the 
defendant did not choose the forum, seems unfair. Moreover, allowing 
these claims provides no increased incentive for plaintiffs to file in federal 
court.28 
In sum, Kroger does provide good guidance on the appropriate rules for 
supplemental jurisdiction in diversity cases. First, these rules should take 
into account the effect on the total diversity rule and. whether allowing 
jurisdiction will have any likely impact on the number of diversity cases in 
federal court. Second, the rules should promote fairness and efficiency, 
particularly as to parties who did not choose the forum. Finally, the rules 
should be relatively easy to apply and hence should focus on entire catego-
ries of procedural situations, rather than on the particular circumstances 
of individual cases. 
To these three principles, I would add a fourth - as to each proce-
dural category, the rules should be clear. Professors Rowe, Burbank, and 
Mengler suggest that subsection (b) was drafted to avoid "statutory rigid-
ity."29 The drafters, they explained, did not want to forego "the benefits 
of the lower court case law development."30 If" the statute contemplates, as 
does Kroger, that answers to these jurisdictional issues will be decided for 
<;ntire procedural categories, I see little to be gained by having lower 
28 See supra notes 16-17 and accompanying text. 
27 See Kroger, 437 U.S. at 375-76. 
28 Indeed, denying jurisdiction in these situations might increase the filings in federal courts by 
plaintiffs wishing to avoid counterclaims. 
29 Rowe, Burbank & Mengler, supra note 3, at 959. 
30 /d. 
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courts struggle to figure out the correct answer for each category. Thus, 
for example, either plaintiffs can counterclaim against non-diverse im-
pleaded parties or they cannot The statute should provide the answer 
clearly and concretely. The ideal solution might be a set of regulations, 
like Treasury Regulations, that spelled out the various procedural permu-
tations and provided the answer as to how those are to be treated. Given 
that s.uch an option is unavailable, I think it is reasonable to expect the 
statute to provide clear answers to the full set of foreseeable procedural 
permutations. 
B. Specifics of the Statute 
1. Meaning of the Last Clause 
Subsection (b) prohibits supplemental jurisdiction under certain speci-
fied situations "when exercising supplemental jurisdiction over such 
claims would be inconsistent with the jurisdictional requirements of sec-
tion 1332."31 This language appears to invite a Kroger-type inquiry into 
whether allowing jurisdiction would undermine total diversity by encour-
aging suits to be filed in federal court that otherwise would not have been 
filed there. Thus, as to whether in response to a counterclaim, a plaintiff 
can implead a non-diverse party, I assume one would analyze the likeli-
hood of a sneaky plaintiff scenario. 
I have two problems with this clause. First, if the purpose is as I have 
described above, the language could have been clearer. One might con-
clude that anytime non-diverse parties are allowed to claim against each 
other, that is "inconsistent with the jurisdictional requirements of section 
1332." Under this interpretation of the language, there would be no cir-
cumstance in which a plaintiff could ever claim against a non-diverse 
party. Thus, the clause could not be used to permit a plaintiff either to 
counterclaim against a non-diverse third party or to implead a non-diverse 
third party in response to a counterclaim. 32 Of course, this interpretation 
would make this clause surplus because one needs to rely on supplemental 
jurisdiction only if there is no independent basis for jurisdiction. One 
might nonetheless justify this interpretation as a restatement of what con-
.. 28 u.s.c. § 1367(b). 
32 See Rowe, Burbank & Mengler, supra note 3, at 959-60 (arguing that the clause might be 
used to permit jurisdiction in such cases). 
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stitutes supplemental jurisdiction. Even if this is not the best reading of 
this clause, I can report that about a third of the 260 law students to 
whom I taught this statute last year thought that the clause obviously had 
this meaning. While I do not offer this as a scientific survey, I do think it 
at least suggests that lawyers who are not steeped in Kroger may not fully 
appreciate the significance of this clause. 
Assuming that the clause will allow courts sometimes to find jurisdic-
tion over claims between non-diverse parties,33 the second problem is that 
the intended scope of this authorization is unclear. Professors Rowe, Bur-
bank, and Mengler suggest that the clause should be treated as a kind of 
catchall .provision that will deal with situations not otherwise covered by 
the statute.34 That, however, is not the way the statute is written. Instead, 
the clause appears to apply in all situations, not merely in unforeseen 
situations. 
For example, consider how a case identical to Kroger would be ana-
lyzed under the statute. The statute does not say that a plaintiff can never 
claim against a non-diverse impleaded party. Rather, it says that a plain-
tiff cannot claim against that party if it would be inconsistent with 
§ 1332. This might be construed to invite a case by case examination of 
whether this plaintiff was attempting to circumvent the total diversity 
rule. Under this analysis, jurisdiction would have been allowed in Kroger 
because, as noted above, there was little reason to think Mrs. Kroger was 
a sneaky plaintiff.35 Alternatively, the clause at the end of subsection (b) 
may be addressed to categories of cases, but may mean that the statute 
itself does not take a position on whether jurisdiction should be permitted 
in any of the listed situations. Instead, the statute simply invites the fed-
eral courts to decide whether, in any category of cases, allowing supple-
mental jurisdiction would undermine · § 1332. If this is what the clause 
means, then it would have been much clearer to eliminate the enumera-
tion of particular situations within that subsection and simply to provide 
that, in diversity cases, supplemental jurisdiction shall not be permitted 
where it would be inconsistent with § 1332. At least the courts would then 
know that the entire area had been turned over to them. The third possi-
bility is that the clause is a catchall to cover unforeseen situations. If this 
•• See id. at 953. 
•• Id. at 959-60. 
•• See supra note 18 and accompanying text. 
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is the correct interpretation, then the language should be modified to clar-
ify that the clause applies only in situations not otherwise addressed by 
the statute. 
2. The Cases Not Covered by Subsection (b) 
Subsection (b) does not provide clear answers on_ how courts are sup-
posed to treat supplemental jurisdiction in some easily foreseeable situa-
tions: class actions,36 joinder of non-diverse plaintiffs under Rule 20,37 
counterclaims of plaintiffs against impleaded third parties,38 impleader 
claims by a plaintiff in response to a counterclaim,39 or claims by plain-
tiffs against impleaded parties where the case was removed to federal 
court.40 As to all of these, the statute should provide a clear answer.41 I 
am sure that, even without statutory amendment, consensus answers even-
tually will emerge from the cases. But why should we have to wait? 
3. Necessary Parties and Intervenors 
As to the above described cases, uncertainty exists because the statute 
simply does not appear to address those situations. In contrast, the statute 
36 See Freer, supra note 6, at 485-86; Rowe, Burbank & Mengler, supra note 3, at 960 n.90. 
37 See Rowe, Burbank & Mengler, supra note 3, at 961 n.91. 
36 See Freer, supra note 6, at 482-84. 
39 See id. 
40 See id. at 485; Rowe, Burbank & Mengler, supra note 3, at 960 n.90. 
41 Professor Freer argues, as have others, that the total diversity requirement for alienage juris-
diction should be changed. See Freer, supra note 6, at 474-75; Thomas D. Rowe, Jr., Abolishing 
Diversity jurisdiction: Positive Side Effects and Potential for Further Reforms, 92 HARV. L. REv. 
963, 968 (1979); Nancy M. Berkley, Note, Federal jurisdiction Over Suits Between Diverse United 
States Citizens with Aliens joined to Both Sides of the Controversy Under 28 U.S. C.§ 1332(aX3), 38 
RUTGERS L. REV. 71, ;:'5 (1985). Freer notes that this goal could have been accomplished through 
supplemental jurisdiction, but concludes that § 1367 .probably precludes this. Freer, supra note 6, at 
475. The response of Professors Rowe, Burbank, and Mengler is ambiguous. At one point, they seem 
to suggest that the last clause of§ 1367(b) may enable courts to use supplemental jurisdiction as Freer 
suggests. See Rowe, Burbank & Mengler, supra note 3, at 954-55. On the other hand, they also seem 
to argue that supplemental jurisdiction is not the proper cure for the problem Freer identifies, and 
that the new statute does not provide this cure. Instead, they suggest that both the problem and the 
solution lie in reinterpreting or amending § 1332. See id. I do not think it makes sense to read the last 
clause of § 1367(b) to permit supplemental jurisdiction in a situation that is· flatly inconsistent with 
the accepted understanding of § 1332. Although this statute did present an opportunity for Congress 
to reconsider the alienage rule, I do not find it particularly troubling that Congress chose not to 
consider that issue. As Professors Rowe, Burbank, and Mengler correctly note, nothing in § 1367 
would preclude the courts from reinterpreting, or 'Congress from amending, § 1332. 
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does specifically address Rule 19 and 24 parties. Nonetheless, I perceive 
significant uncertainty both as to the statute's application and as to its 
rationale. If the statute does what I think it does, I question its wisdom. 
a. Rule 19 I 24 "Anomaly" 
Prior to the passage of § 1367 federal courts had ancillary jurisdiction 
over intervenors of right,42 but not over Rule 19 parties.43 This different 
treatment is not really an anomaly, but merely an attempt to walk the line 
between the total diversity rule and the fairness concerns described 
above.44 Intervenors do not choose the forum and have no ability to move 
the case to a forum in which they can participate. If we believe in the 
concept of intervention of right, then we ought to allow people into suits 
regardless of their citizenship. Of course, it is possible to have the sneaky 
plaintiff problem. A plaintiff may have wanted a non-diverse potential 
intervenor in the case all along but not joined her, knowing, or at least 
hoping, that the intervenor would. enter on her own. In determining the 
supplemental jurisdiction rules, the choice is whether to· keep out all non-
diverse intervenors, so as to prevent the small increase in federal filings we 
would get from these sneaky plaintiffs, or to allow a slight docket increase 
because we believe that people having an interest in litigation ought to be 
able to intervene. Given this choice, allowing supplemental jurisdiction 
seems appropriate. 45 
With respect to Rule 19 parties, the attempt to accommodate the total 
diversity rule and fairness can sensibly lead to the decision to exclude sup-
plemental jurisdiction. The fairness considerations are somewhat different 
because there is no outsider seeking to join the case.46 Moreover, the court 
has the ability through Rule 19(b) to prevent serious unfairness, either by 
restructuring the remedy or dismissing the case. On the other hand, al-
•• See Wichita R.R. & Light Co. v. Public Utils. Comm'n, 260 U.S. 48, 53-54 (1922); Phelps v. 
Oaks, 117 U.S. 236, 240-41 (1886); 7C CHARLES A. WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & MARY K. 
KANE, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE§ 1917 (2d ed. 1986). 
43 See 7C WRIGHT, MILLER & KANE, supra note 42, at 479-80. 
•• See supra notes 16-28 and accompanying text. 
•• See 7C WRIGHT, MILLER & KANE, supra note 42, at 481. 
46 As Professor Steinman has noted, intervention is a "reality check on the contention that the 
absentee truly is concerned that its interests may be impaired." Joan Steinman, Postremoval Changes 
in the Party Structure of Diversity Cases: The Old Law, the New Law, and Rule 19, 38 KAN. L. 
REV. 863, 918 (1990). 
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lowing supplemental jurisdiction over Rule 19 parties seems more likely 
to encourage sneaky plaintiffs to sue in federal courts than would a simi-
lar result in the·Rule 24 context. Plaintiffs are likely to know, or be able 
to ascertain, the identity of Rule 19 parties and plaintiffs do not have to 
rely on the desire of the absent party to participate - the absent party 
can be forced into the case under Rule 19. 
The law in existence prior to the statute went one step further. in its 
attempt to walk the line between accommodating the total diversity rule 
and fairness. If an intervenor met the criteria of a Rule 19(b) party,, the 
court would not permit intervention, but would instead dismiss the case.47 
In denying supplemental jurisdiction, the courts in essence held that the 
case should have been filed originally with the non-diverse party included. 
Had that happened, the suit, of course, would have been dismissed. The 
situation in which we have a non-diverse and indispensable party is in 
some respects the paradigm case· that violates the total diversity rule. 
Moreover, the fairness problem is mitigated by dismissing the suit. The 
case will presumably be refiled in state court where the indispensable in-
tervenor can either join or be joined in the suit. 
In sum, I felt that the Rule 19/24 "anomaly" was a workable accom-
modation between the competing concerns of p'rotecting the to!al diversity 
rule and protecting fairness to non-parties with a significant interest in 
ongoing litigation. Other balances between these interests could obviously 
be struck.48 My objection to the statute is that it appears to put a priority 
on eliminating the difference in treatment between Rules 19 and 24 and 
ignores the underlying reasons for those differences. 
b. Rule 19 and 24 Parties Under Subsection (b) 
According to Professors Rowe, Burbank, and Mengler's interpretation 
of § 1367, a non-diverse person cannot intervene as a plaintiff under Rule 
24 or be joined as a plaintiff under Rule 19.49 On the other hand, a non-
diverse person can intervene as a defendant under Rule 24 or be joined as 
47 See 7C WRIGHT, MILLER & KANE, supra note 42, at 477-78. 
<s For example, one could allow supplemental jurisdiction over all Rule 19 parties, concluding 
that the benefit outweighs the increase in federal court cases. See Freer, supra note 6, at 477, and 
authorities cited therein. 
•• See Thomas M. Mengler, Stephen B. Burbank & Thomas D. Rowe, Jr., Congress Accepts 
Supreme Court's Invitation to Codify Supplemental jurisdiction, 74 juDICATURE 213, 215 (1991). 
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a defendant under Rule 19.50 However, although Rule 19 and 24 defend-
ants can be joined, the plaintiff cannot claim against them. 51 
I have several difficulties with this approach. First, like Professors 
Freer and Arthur,52 I find the distinction between joining someone as a 
defendant and claiming against that defendant unsatisfying. I do not un-
derstand how one can be a party without having a claim or being claimed 
against. 53 
Second, even if subsection (b) does not prohibit jurisdiction over added 
parties but only over claims by or against those parties, subsection (b) 
does not itself grant jurisdiction. The grant of jurisdiction comes from 
subsection (a) and that subsection only authorizes jurisdiction over 
"claims." Thus, if the distinction Professors Rowe, Burbank and Mengler 
draw with respect to subsection (b) applies to subsection (a), subsection 
(a) only authorizes supplemental jurisdiction over added parties when 
they claim or are claimed against. 
Third, even if the distinction b·etween being joined and being claimed 
against is sustainable, then it seems sustainable as to both defendants and 
plaintiffs. The statute prohibits jurisdiction "over claims by persons pro-
posed to be joined as plaintiffs under Rule 19 ... or seeking to intervene 
as plaintiffs under Rule 24."54 Thus, although Professors Rowe, Bur-
bank, and Mengler assert that the statute prohibits joinder of Rule 19 and 
24 plaintiffs,55 it seems it could just as easily be read to permit joinder, 
•• See Rowe, Burbank & Mengler, supra note 3, at 957 & n.68. 
61 See id. 
•• Arthur & Freer, supra note 6, at 967-72. 
•• I found Professors Freer and Arthur's analogy to interpleader particularly persuasive. See id. 
at 971-72. In both Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755·(1989), and Helzberg's Diamond Shops, Inc. v. 
Valley W. Des Moines Shopping Ctr., Inc., 564 F.2d 816 (8th Cir. 1977), the defendants were like 
stakeholders. In Wilks the "stake" was seniority rights; il) Helzberg's the "stake" was exclusive access 
to a mall. In both cases, if the defendant gave the plaintiffs the rights they sought, those defendants 
would be unable to give the same right to the absent party. Thus, although the plaintiff in those cases 
did not have a claim against the absent party, that party was a potential claimant against the 
"stakeholding" defendant. This analysis may suggest that the Rule 19 parties in those cases should be 
considered plaintiffs, not defendants. Cf Reeves v. Harrell, 791 F.2d 1481, 1484 {11th Cir. 1986), 
cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1033 {1987) {white sheriffs intervened to challenge a consent decree between 
black sheriffs and county commissioners; in determining whether intervenors were liable for attorney 
fees, court treated intervenors as plaintiffs). However, if they are plaintiffs, then according ·to Profes-
sors Rowe, Burbank, and Mengler, they cannot be joined. 
64 28 U.S.C.A. § 1367{b) (emphasis added). 
•• See Mengler, Burbank & Rowe, supra note 49, at 215. 
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but prohibit those joined parties from claiming. 
Fourth, the statute does not differentiate between intervenors of right 
and permissive intervenors. Under prior law, there was no supplemental 
jurisdiction over permissive intervenors under Rule 24(b).5•6 Under the 
statute, as least as to intervening defendants, there is supplemental juris-
diction over permissive intervenors. Of course, if the distinction between 
being joined and being claimed against holds, no plaintiff can claim 
against an intervening defendant. That restriction, if it means anything, is 
likely to suit the intervenors just fine. Thus, the statute seems to expand 
supplemental jurisdiction to permissive intervenors. 
Fifth, assuming, as I noted above, that Rule 19 and 24 plaintiffs can be 
joined, but cannot claim, then this expansion of supplemental jurisdiction 
applies to plaintiff permissive intervenors. 
Consequently, I am unsure wh:ether the new statute expands or con-
tracts supplemental jurisdiction for Rule 19 and 24 parties. The statute 
draws distinctions between plaintiffs and defendants, but if my interpreta-
tion is correct, that distinction is more apparent than real. On the other 
hand, if the statute does indeed treat Rule 19 and 24 plaintiffs differently 
than defendants, then neither the legislative history nor the statute's back-
ers have offered any explanation for the different treatment. The "anom-
aly" the statute tried to fix seems less troubling than the cure. 
C.' A Proposed Revision to Subsection (b) 
As indicated earlier, I believe it would be appropriate to seek revisions. 
to subsection (b). In the interest of advancing this goal, I offer below Te-
vised language for subsection (b). Although confident that others will be 
able to improve upon this draft, I offer it simply as an attempt to begin 
the revision process. 
(B) IN ANY CIVIL ACTION OF WHICH DISTRICT COURTS HAVE ORIG-
INAL JURISDICTION FOUNDED SOLELY ON SECTION 1332. OF THIS 
TITLE, OR FOUNDED ON SECTION 1441 OF THIS TITLE WHERE THE 
SOLE BASIS FOR REMOVAL WAS THE EXISTENCE OF JURISDICTION 
UNDER SECTION 1332, THE DISTRICT COURTS SHALL NOT HAVE 
SUPPLEMENTAL JURISDICTION EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BELOW: 
•• See 7C WRIGHT, MILLER & KANE, supra note 42, at 466. 
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(1) IN CLASS AGriON SUITS, SUPPLEMENTAL JURISDIC-
TION MAY BE USED TO JOIN NON-DIVERSE UNNAMED 
CLASS MEMBERS WHOSE CLAIMS MEET THE AMOUNT IN 
CONTROVERSY; 
(2) SUPPLEMENTAL JURISDIGriON MAY BE USED TO 
JOIN AN INTERVENOR UNDER RULE 24(A) OF THE FED-
ERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, PROVIDED THAT THE 
INTERVENOR DOES NOT MEET THE CRITERIA FOR A 
RULE 19(B) PARTY; 
(3) SUPPLEMENTAL JURISDIGriON MAY BE USED BY 
ANY PARTY TO (I) JOIN ANY THIRD PARTY UNDER RULE 
14 AND BRING A RULE 14 CLAIM AGAINST THAT THIRD 
PARTY; (11) JOIN ANY RULE 13(H) PARTY AND CLAIM 
AGAINST THAT PARTY; AND (III) BRING A COMPULSORY 
COUNTERCLAIM OR CROSS-CLAIM AGAINST ANY OTHER 
PARTY. 
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This draft is intended largely to codify the law in existence before 
§ 1367 was enacted. As a matter of political reality, I think revisions to 
subsection (b) are more likely to pass if they are viewed as mere technical 
corrections. I would save for another day battles about class actions or 
about e~panding or contracting diversity jurisdiction. 
The revised version provides that there shall be no supplemental juris-
diction in diversity cases except as specified in the statute. I do not intend 
this to codify an anti-diversity bias, but instead to reflect the fact that full 
supplemental jurisdiction is inconsistent with the total diversity rule. The 
exceptions to this general rule are intended to insure that there is supple-
mental jurisdiction in those situations where fairness and efficiency de-
mand it. 
This statute would codify the law as it existed before § 1367 with re-
spect to class actions, intervenors, and Rule 19 parties, and would allow 
anyone to counterclaim or cross-claim. It would also codify the result in 
Kroger, but would allow a plaintiff to implead a third party in response 
to counterclaims filed against the plaintiff. In addition, the statute would 
allow a plaintiff to counterclaim against a non-diverse third party im-
pleaded by someone else (as in Kroger), where the third party claims 
against the plaintiff. 
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Finally, for the sake of simplicity, the statute provides that the rules are 
the same in cases of removal. One could make the case in the removal 
situation that the plaintiff should be able to join anyone since she did not 
pick the forum. 57 Likewise, one might prohibit a removing defendant from 
impleading a non-diverse third party.58 Nonetheless, I think it would un-
duly complicate the law to have different rules for supplemental jurisdic-
tion in removed cases. · 
There is, however, a potential unfairness that can arise in the removal 
context. Where the case is removed to federal court and the plaintiff seeks 
to join non-diverse parties, it may be unfair both to deny joinder and to 
keep the case in federal court.59 The solution is found in § 1447(e) which 
provides: "If after removal the plaintiff seeks to join additional defendants 
whose joinder would destroy subject matter jurisdiction, the court may 
deny joinder, or permit joinder and remand the action to the State 
court."60 This provision provides some protection where the plaintiff 
wants to add a new party. It does not, however, apply in a case like Kro-
ger, where the plaintiff seeks to claim against a non,.diverse party joined 
by someone else. In order to remedy this, I would amend § 1447(e) to 
read: "If after removal the plaintiff seeks to join additional claims or par-
ties where there is no subject matter jurisdiction over those claims or 
parties, the court may deny joinder, or permit joinder and remand the 
action to the State court." 
CONCLUSION 
The new supplemental jurisdiction statute was a prompt and necessary 
response to the mess that Finley created. Unfortunately, subsection (b) of 
the statute has significant flaws. However, those flaws are correctable and 
the statute warrants prompt revision before too many judicial resources 
are expended. 
•• See Steinman, supra note 46, at 902. 
•• See Perdue, supra note 5, at 565. 
•• See Steinman, supra note 46, at 930-31. 
60 28 U.S.C. § 1447(e) (1988). 
